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Personnel System Constraints in Public Organizations: A Study of Intraorganizational 
Variation and Performance 
 
Abstract 
Prior research has shown that personnel constraints are far more prevalent in the public sector 
than in the private sector. Anecdotal accounts suggest that public managers are hamstrung by 
these personnel constraints – particularly their inability to reward and punish employees to 
promote higher performance. As a result, more than three decades of public management reform 
has attempted to loosen these constraints on the assumption that more personnel system 
flexibility will lead to increased organizational performance. We mount an empirical study to test 
this assumption with data taken from a large-scale survey of English local authorities and other 
sources. We operationalize personnel constraints using Rainey’s (1979; Rainey et al. 1976) long-
standing measures: “difficulty in removing poor managers” and “difficulty in rewarding good 
managers”. We show that attitudes towards personnel constraint vary within organizations in 
statistically significant ways. The results from our lagged autoregressive multiple regression 
models also show that one of our personnel constraint measures—“difficulty in removing poor 
managers”— is harmful to performance but that the other “difficulty in rewarding good 
managers” has weak but positive short-term effects. The implications of these findings for public 
management research and practice are considered in the concluding section of the paper. 
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Introduction 
Empirical research has shown that personnel system constraints are far more prevalent in public 
organizations than in private sector organizations (for summaries of the literature that support this 
point, see Bozeman and Rainey, 2000; Rainey, 2003; 2007). Personnel constraints are argued to 
constrain public managers and stifle organizational performance. One intended purpose of 
management reforms implemented in public agencies over recent decades has been to loosen 
these constraints on the assumption that more personnel system flexibility will lead to greater 
managerial effectiveness and increased organizational performance (Bouckaert and Halligan 
2007; OECD 2005; United Nations 2005; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Gore 1993).  
 This study examines this proposition empirically, presents evidence on the effects of 
overly burdensome personnel system constraints at the organizational level, and also investigates 
intraorganizational variation between echelons. In undertaking this task, we draw upon Rainey’s 
(1976; Rainey et al. 1979) longstanding measures of personnel constraints that gauge “difficulty 
in rewarding good managers” and “difficulty in removing poor managers”.1 That is, can 
managers effectively reward and punish the employees they oversee? Efforts to reform public 
agencies have led to alternative strategies on these two personnel constraints. Approaches to 
increasing managers’ ability to remove poorly performing employees include empowering 
managers, removing constraints on their ability to manage, and instituting performance 
management systems that connect employee efforts with results. Approaches to improving 
managers’ ability to reward employees include increased reliance on the performance appraisal 
process and pay-for-performance schemes. Evidence on the effectiveness of these reforms is not 
very impressive. This evidence suggests that little progress has been made in developing 
                                                
1 There are other ways of conceiving and measuring constraints, such as time delays in hiring and removing 
employees. However, we believe Rainey’s measures of reward and punishment lie at the heart of managing for 
higher performance. 
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strategies to remove poorly performing managers, and that pay-for-performance has produced 
from little to negative results in the public sector. Yet the evidentiary record is weak and consists 
mostly of case studies and empirical studies that have rather major limitations: one such 
limitation is that few studies have examined the impact of these reforms on robust measures of 
organizational performance. To this end, we undertake what is – to the best of our knowledge – 
the first empirical test of the proposition that managers’ perceptions of personnel constraints 
suppress public service performance. 
 Our data come from a large-scale survey of English local authorities and other sources. 
The analysis is lagged so that all independent variables are measured prior to the dependent 
variable thus simulating time-order and improving on standard cross-sectional designs that 
cannot account for time lags between cause and effect—a crucial element of causality. We also 
include a measure of prior performance to ensure that the personnel constraint coefficients are not 
biased. 
 Findings from this analysis show that “difficulty in rewarding good managers” has a 
small positive effect on performance in contrast to the reform pronunciations, but “difficulty in 
removing poor managers” actually reduces performance as anticipated in this literature. These 
findings, therefore, suggest that the considerable effort that has been expended in the design and 
implementation of pay-for-performance reward schemes has not directly improved public service 
performance. Conversely, our findings suggest that more effort needs to be devoted to loosening 
personnel systems so that poor performers can be dealt with and more optimal performance 
achieved. We hasten to add that these effects are stronger amongst senior corporate officers rather 
than chief officers or service managers. Thus, for most public managers working at middle and 
lower echelons of the bureaucracy, it does not appear that personnel constraints exert a major 
impact on performance.  
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 In the next section, we go into more detail on why personnel system constraints are more 
prevalent in the public sector, and why such constraints are thought to bind public managers and 
lower organizational performance. This leads to several testable hypotheses. In the next section, 
we introduce our data and methods; and in the following section, we test the hypotheses and 
report the results. Finally, the implications of these findings for public management research and 
practice are discussed. 
 
The impact of personnel constraints 
Empirical research has shown that personnel system constraints are far more prevalent in the 
public sector than in the private sector. Such constraints are usually attributed to traditional civil 
service systems that promulgate rules to protect public employees from political interference and 
egregious personnel actions, thus also serving to promote fairness and equity in the public service 
(Nigro, Nigro and Kellough 2007; Brewer and Kellough, 2008). Indeed, government is expected 
to be a model employer and set high standards in these regards. 
 Civil service systems are typically built on merit principles that are founded on open and 
competitive examinations as a basis for selection, strong norms of neutral competence, and 
relative security of tenure for employees. Traditional systems have relied on centralized oversight 
of the personnel function and numerous rules to ensure political non-interference and equity in 
the treatment of all applicants and employees. As a consequence, these systems have been 
criticized for delay, inflexibility, and harmful effects on organizational performance. There 
appears to be a fundamental trade-off between the merit principle, neutral competence, and fair 
play on one hand, and economy, efficiency, and performance on the other. 
 In recent years, conventional wisdom has suggested that arthritic civil service systems, 
which are characterized by burdensome personnel system constraints that limit the ability of 
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managers to reward good employees and remove bad ones, may be the primary culprit for 
flagging government performance. NPM, Reinventing Government, and other reform agendas 
have been quick to take up this mantle (Gore 1993; U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, 1999; 
Blair 2002). Reformers contend that public organizations should cut red tape, empower 
managers, and encourage them to be entrepreneurial. An important element of these reforms is to 
increase managerial flexibility and give managers a freer hand to recruit, select, reward, and 
discipline employees. One signal catch-phrase of this reform movement is to roll back overly 
constraining civil service system rules and “let managers manage.”  
For some time now, reformers have emphasized the need to weaken civil service systems, 
give agencies greater discretion, and enhance the flexibility of line managers – particularly on 
personnel matters. Indeed, civil service systems are changing from purely legal-bureaucratic 
modes of control to more market style modes of control. Old systems were characterized by 
centralized collective bargaining, uniform pay increases, steep and detailed career ladders with 
intra-service mobility, tightly written job descriptions, and lifetime employment security. The 
behavior of personnel was governed by detailed, input-oriented budgets. In the new model, 
collective bargaining is decentralized, pay is more individuated, career ladders are short and job 
descriptions loose, recruitment from the outside replaces intra-service mobility, and hiring/firing 
is possible. Budgets are shifting to looser, output-based controls over personnel, who are being 
liberated and empowered to take risks. In short, the public sector is conforming more and more to 
the normal disciplines of the private sector (Brewer, 2001). 
From this discussion and other sources (such as Bozeman and Rainey 2000 and Walker 
and Brewer 2008), we derive three guiding hypotheses and a couple of sub-hypotheses: 
H1: Personnel constraints have detrimental effects on public service performance 
  H1a Constraints on the ability to remove poor managers have detrimental 
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   effects on public service performance. 
  H1b Constraints on the ability to reward good managers have detrimental  
   effects on public service performance. 
H2: Perceptions of the extent of personnel constraints will vary between organizational 
echelons. 
H3: The detrimental effect of personnel constraints on public service performance will 
vary between organizational echelons 
 
Data and Methods 
Unit of Analysis 
This study is situated in the English local government sector. English local governments are 
politically elected bodies with a Westminster style cabinet system of political management.2 
They employ professional career staff and receive between two-thirds and three-quarters of their 
income and guidance on the implementation of legislation from the central government.3 These 
are multi-purpose authorities but not all-purpose; for example, health care is provided by separate 
health authorities.  
 There are five types of local authorities. Three types are comprehensive—that is, one 
authority provides all designated services to one geographically-defined community. These types 
of authorities are typically found in urban areas and include London boroughs, metropolitan 
districts, and unitary authorities. A two-tier system prevails in small towns and rural areas. 
                                                
2 In a Westminster political system (such as the UK), the cabinet represents the de facto executive branch of 
government, and is usually made up of senior members of the ruling political party, all of whom collectively decide 
public policy and government strategy. 
3 All services are regulated. Education services and schools are regulated by the Office for Schools Standards Social 
Services by the Social Services Inspectorate, Benefits and Revenues by the Benefits Fraud Inspection Services, 
Housing by the Audit Commission Housing Inspection, and all other services by the Audit Commission Inspectorate. 
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County councils or shires are the upper tier authority and district councils the lower tier. This 
variation in structural arrangements means that in areas with London boroughs and metropolitan 
councils, authorities are responsible for virtually everything. However, in two-tier systems, 
services such as fire, transport, and waste disposal are delivered by joint committees.  
 Two levels of analysis are adopted. For our test of personnel constraints on organizational 
performance, we undertake the analysis at the organizational level. When we explore variations 
of attitudes towards personnel constraints, we delve into the organization and examine three 
echelons or levels within the organizational hierarchy (Aiken and Hage 1968). These are 
corporate officers, chief officers, and service managers (see below). 
Data Source 
Data were drawn from a survey of English local authorities (for data collection procedures and 
pilot information, see Enticott 2003). This study focuses on major authorities, which include 
county councils, metropolitan boroughs, London boroughs, and unitary authorities. District 
councils, the tier of local government below county councils, were excluded from this analysis 
because the measure of performance used in this study is not available for these authorities (see 
below). The survey was conducted in 2004 and was a census of all 175 major upper-tier 
authorities. Responses were received from 136 authorities (77.7% response rate). The survey 
explored informants’ perceptions of organization and management, drivers of service 
improvement, and background variables.4 All questions were in the form of Likert-type scales 
ranging from 1 (disagree) to 7 (agree).  
Multiple informant data were collected from staff at the corporate and service level in 
                                                
4 A copy of the full questionnaire is available on request from the authors. 
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each organization.5 This strategy was adopted to address the weakness of prior studies that have 
essentially been elite surveys, which typically collect evidence on organizational leaders’ 
aspirations rather than actual organizational behaviors, and which overlooks the range of different 
perceptions within organizations (Bowman and Ambrosini 1997; Walker and Enticott 2004; 
Brewer 2005). To create the organizational level data, two levels were used to overcome the 
sample bias problem faced in surveying large numbers of informants from one organizational 
level (see Enticott et al. 2009 for a detailed discussion). For this sample, a simple organizational 
mean would drown out the voices of the smaller numbers of corporate officers surveyed.6 
Corporate and service officers were selected for the two echelons because attitudes have been 
found to differ between these positions (Aiken and Hage 1968; Walker and Enticott 2004). An 
organizational mean is derived from a mean of corporate officers and a mean of service officers. 
To test variation amongst echelons, we examined corporate officers and then split the 
service officers into the two groups that constitute this echelon: chief officers and service 
managers (see footnote 4). A mean was calculated for each group in each organization by adding 
the scores recorded by each respondent in each service. For the three echelons, responses were 
thus: corporate officers 105, chief officers 127, and service managers 129, totalling 361 
organizational echelons. 
                                                
5 Corporate officers include the chief executive officer, or head of paid service, and corporate policy directors with 
cross-organizational responsibilities for service delivery and improvement. Service officers include two sets of 
officers drawn from seven services: benefits and revenues, culture and leisure, education, housing, land use planning, 
social services, and waste management services. First, chief officers who are the most senior officer with specific 
service delivery responsibility, they include the Director of Education or the Director of Planning. Second, service 
officers or front-line supervisory officers. They include Head of School Organization and Planning and Head of 
Business Efficiency.  
6 In each authority surveyed, questionnaires were sent to up to three corporate officers and up to twenty-eight service 
officers—four across seven core services: education, social care, land-use planning, waste management, housing, 
library and leisure and benefits services.  
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Dependent variable: performance 
A robust measure of performance is likely to fulfil three criteria. First, it should be a multi-
dimensional measure that covers the many concerns of public management such as quality, 
efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness, and equity (for a review of this literature see Andrews 
et al. 2006; Boyne, 2002; Carter, Klein & Day, 1992; ). Second, a range of stakeholders, inside 
and outside of the organization being assessed, are likely to hold views on what constitutes high 
levels of governmental performance (Andrews, Boyne & Walker, 2006; Brewer, 2005, 2006; 
Walker & Boyne, 2006). External judgments made by stakeholders in the environment of an 
organization (e.g. service consumers, voters, regulators) are likely to offer more robust views. 
External measures of performance are undertaken some distance from the public organization 
being judged and thus are less likely to be contaminated by common source bias (Andrews, 
Boyne and Walker, 2006). Third, performance measures should include a range of different 
information about an organization; this could include data from performance indicators, strategic 
and operational plans, and inspector’s reports. This will ensure that a number of subjective 
measures are combined with objective data on the performance of a public agency. English local 
government is blessed with a measure that meets these criteria: the core service performance 
(CSP) of the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA). 
The CSP is determined for each of the seven service areas. It is based largely on archival 
performance indicators and supplemented by the results of inspection and assessment of statutory 
plans (Andrews et al. 2005). The archival performance indicators cover six aspects of 
organizational performance: quantity of outputs (e.g. number of home visits for the elderly), 
quality of outputs (e.g. number of serious injuries on highways), efficiency (e.g. cost per benefit 
claimed), formal effectiveness (e.g. average school passes at 16), equity (e.g. equal access to 
public housing), and consumer satisfaction (e.g. satisfaction with waste collection). Inspection of 
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services draws upon internal improvement plans, field visits, and other documentation. Statutory 
plans are assessed against the criteria of the service’s relevant central government department. 
Evaluators external to the local authority conduct all assessments. Each service area is given a 
performance score by the Audit Commission from 1 (lowest) to 4 (highest).  
After calculating the CSP score for each service area, the Audit Commission derives a 
score for the whole organization by weighting services to reflect their relative importance by 
budget (the weight for education and social services is 4, for environment health and housing is 2, 
and for libraries and leisure, benefits, and management of resources is 1). The Commission then 
combines these weights with the performance score (1 – 4) for each service area to calculate the 
CSP. The resulting scores range from a minimum of 15 (12 in the case of county councils that do 
not provide either housing or benefits) to a maximum of 60 (48 for county councils). To make the 
CSP scores comparable across all authorities, we calculated the percentage of the maximum 
possible CSP score achieved by the given local government. Therefore, the measure of 
organizational performance in this study is an aggregate measure across the key services areas of 
local governments and includes multiple indicators of performance for each service area. 
 
Independent Variables 
Two measures of personnel constraints were collected in the survey: “even if a manager is a poor 
performer, formal rules make it hard to remove him or her from the organization” (label: remove 
manager) and “the formal pay structures and rules make it hard to reward a good manager with 
higher pay here” (label: reward manager). As we note above, since their inception in Rainey’s 
research in the late 1970s (Rainey, 1976), these measures have been used extensively in studies 
of public and private sector differences and more recently as proxy measures of red tape. Table 1 
provides descriptive data of these and our other measures at the organizational level. 
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[Position of table 1 about here] 
 
Controls 
We include measures of internal controls, external constraints and prior performance in our 
models to counteract potential spurious relationships. Internal controls seek to capture the 
organization’s climate and focus upon its openness and harmony. First, we control for 
developmental culture, that is an organizations disposition towards entrepreneurship, innovation 
and meeting new challenges (Zammuto and Krakower 1991). This approach has been central to 
policy debates in the UK during the period of our research (Blair 2002; OPRS 2002). A 
developmental culture has been shown to turn around the likely harmful effects of other 
organizational constraints such as red tape (Pandy and Moynihan 2006). Informants were asked 
to respond to the following questions: “The service/authority is prepared to take risks” and “The 
service/authority is at the forefront of innovative approaches” (α .76).  
The nature of internal climate can affect an organization’s capacity to focus upon its 
performance. A turbulent internal political climate is likely to result in organizational actors 
focusing their attention on the relationships between different groups rather than service delivery. 
We therefore defined internal political climate as “relationships between members and officers, 
relationships between senior management and front-line staff and so on”. Managers were then 
posed three questions about the extent to which they perceive that: “The internal political context 
during the last financial year the service operates in was: Changing rapidly; Uncertain; Very 
complex” (α .89). Higher scores on this scale indicate greater change, uncertainty and 
complexity. 
We include a number of measures of external constraints, all derived from the 2001 
 13 
census. Service need measures the degree to which the external environment is demanding. It is 
operationalized through a measure of multiple deprivation (and labelled deprivation). 7 Diversity 
of service need is associated with complexity. Increased complexity will reduce the time, 
resources and capacity for performance because meeting a diversity of needs will be demanding. 
For example, if a local authority area has relatively homogeneous characteristics it may be 
possible to deliver services to that one group—for example if the population is mostly comprised 
of one ethnic group it should be relatively easy to establish the needs and preferences of one 
group and develop innovations. On the other hand, if the population is highly complex and 
diverse (containing, for example, many ethnic groups) it will be more demanding to establish 
needs and preferences, and difficult to develop a range of services that suits the entire population. 
Service diversity of need captures the complexity of the level of service need and adopts a 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of ethnic diversity.8 The measure gives a proxy for 
‘fractionalization’ within a local authority area, with a high level of ethnic diversity reflected in a 
high score on the index (labelled diversity).  
Changes in population affect the resources available for the co-production of services. 
Areas of population growth become more prosperous as economically active households migrate 
into new areas (Williams 2003). In these areas it is possible for individuals and families, together 
with the wider availability of community resources, to assist in the provision of services through 
co-production. Evidence indicates that in areas of growth, new residents are likely to be 
economically skilled and socially enterprising and thus able to co-produce services (Armstrong 
                                                
7 Deprivation is measured by the Average Ward Score from the Index of Multiple Deprivation (Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions 2000), which is the standard population-weighted measure of deprivation in 
England used by central government. It provides an overview of the different domains of deprivation (e.g. income, 
employment and health). 
8 A Herfindahl-Hirschman index was created by squaring the proportion of each ethnic group (taken from the 2001 
census, Office for National Statistics 2003) within a local authority and then subtracting the sum of the squares of 
these proportions from 10,000. 
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and Taylor 2000). More affluent members of the community are able to co-produce services and 
provide local authority’s with additional resources that will assist a local government attain 
higher levels of performance. Changes in population is measured by the mean change in the 
population of a local authority between 1991 and 2001. Increases in population are associated 
with greater affluence and higher levels of performance. 
 Prior performance. The rationale for the inclusion of prior performance is that 
organizations are autoregressive systems (O’Toole and Meier 1999). Organizations create 
processes and operating systems designed to produce the same outputs over time. It is therefore 
reasonable to expect that the best predictor of what an organization will do tomorrow it what it 
does today. Managers make many small decisions in everyday practice that can have substantial 
cumulative impact over time. Thus, to ensure that the coefficients for personnel constraints are 
not biased, it is important to include prior achievements in statistical models of performance. To 
this end, we use the CSP performance score from 2003 in our analysis and examine whether 
personnel constraints add to or subtract from this performance baseline. This allows us to make 
observations about the effect of personnel constraints on performance at different points in time 
(label CSP 2003).  
 
Statistical Results 
Results are presented in two parts. We initially examine the effects of personnel constraints on 
performance at the organizational level prior to probing into the organizations’ echelons. For the 
organization and its three echelons, we present two models. Model 1 examines the impact of 
personnel constraints on public service performance controlling for internal and external 
characteristics. Model 2 includes these variables and adds the autoregressive term. In all our 
models there are no problems of multicollinearity; the highest VIF recorded is 1.114. The 
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explanatory power of the models varies—as would be expected the autoregressive models 
explain around three-quarters of the variation while those without the prior performance measure 
offer adjusted multiple coefficients of determination (adjusted R2s) that range from 5 and 19 
percent. 
 
Organizational level results 
Table 2 provides summary statistical results from our regression analysis, and we commence our 
discussion with the control variables. By and large, these variables perform as anticipated. 
Developmental culture is positive and statistically significant in both models and internal political 
climate is negative and significant (albeit at the lower ten percent level). Diversity and population 
change have longer-term effects on performance as anticipated and as reported in other studies 
emanating from this dataset (see for example Andrews et al. 2005). Somewhat unexpectedly, 
deprivation has a short-term and statistically significant impact on public service performance. 
Lastly, as anticipated in an autoregressive system, prior performance is statistically significant 
and does much of the hard hitting in this model. 
[position of table 2 about here] 
 The variable remove manager is negative and statistically significant in both models. In 
model 1, the variable attains significance at the lower ten percent threshold. This indicates that 
organizational policies and procedures make it hard to remove poorly performing managers. 
Reading across the two models, the results indicate that the inability to remove a poorly 
performing manager hurts performance in the long-term, but that it also has stronger short-term 
effects—in Model 2 the statistical significance of the variable raises to the more commonly 
accepted five percent level. Reward manager has no effect when this personnel constraint is 
considered in the longer-term, alongside internal and external controls. There are, however, short-
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term effects—the coefficient is positive and significant, at the lower ten percent level of statistical 
significance, in Model 2. The findings indicate that not being able to reward a high performing 
manger with pay works for the good and has positive effects on performance. These statistical 
results offer support for H1a but not H1b. 
Intraorganizational variation amongst echelons 
We commence our analysis of intraorganizational variation amongst the three echelons identified 
in this study by way of a difference of means test. This analysis tests H2 prior to undertaking 
multivariate analysis. Table 3 presents the means and results of the ANOVA test for corporate 
officers, chief officers, and service managers. Corporate officers are less likely to report the 
constraints remove manager and reward manager in comparison to their counterparts lower 
down the hierarchy. What is of interest with these results is that the constraints worsen the further 
one travels down the organization. The ANOVA results confirm this finding. For the remove 
manager variable, there are statistically significant differences between corporate officers and 
service managers, while for the reward manager variable, the differences are between corporate 
officers and chief officers and service managers. These results do not categorically support H1. 
They do, however, offer reasonable evidence to support the notion that attitudes towards 
personnel constraints vary within organizations (H2). Given that most studies have examined 
interorganizational differences rather than intraorganization variation, these results provide 
further evidence on the complex way in which personnel constraints are played out and viewed. 
 Another pattern in the results is that perceptions of personnel constraints – on both the 
remove manager and reward manager variables – grow larger as we move down the echelons 
from top-level officials to middle managers, and finally to frontline managers. In fact, frontline 
managers who are working in the trenches perceive the highest levels of all. Perhaps these street-
level bureaucrats feel more constrained they are subject to systematic personnel constraints which 
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affect all managers in the organization, plus they are subject to additional constraints imposed on 
them by overhead managers – the corporate officers and chief officers in this case. Another 
reason may be that concerns about accountability and responsible flow downhill and weigh 
heavier on frontline managers.  
 [position of table 3 about here] 
Multivariate results are presented in table 4. Results for the control variables are similar to those 
reported in table 2 and we do not elaborate on these here. We make three points in relation to the 
personnel constraint measures and their impact on organizational performance. First, the 
statistical results for the corporate officers present findings similar to those at the organizational 
level, though with stronger effects in the autoregressive model. While this group of officers 
reported mean scores lower than other echelons (table 3) they nonetheless identify consequences. 
Second, service managers note statistically significant negative effects arising from the inability 
to remove a poor manager. The coefficient for reward manager does not, by contrast, attain 
statistically significance in either model. Finally, in the chief officers echelon, neither variable 
achieves statistical significance in either model. Overall, these results offer mixed support for H3. 
 
Discussion 
As is often the case, the findings reported in this study suggest that a fundamental assumption of 
public management theory and practice is more complex than we hitherto thought. It appears that 
personnel constraints affecting managers’ ability to deal with poorly performing employees may 
undercut performance. Yet constraints on managers’ ability to reward highly performing 
employees does not have much effect. Moreover, managers at different echelons perceive these 
constraints differently, with those nearer the front lines perceiving the greatest number of 
constraints. When these perceptions are linked to performance, we find that the views reported by 
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top-level officials are most strongly linked to performance, while those of lower echelon officials 
are more weakly linked.   
 The implications for public management practice are straightforward. Efforts to enable 
managers to deal more effectively with poor performers are likely to produce higher levels of 
organizational performance. On the other hand, persistent efforts to implement pay-for-
performance systems will likely continue to be a bust for public organizations. These systems do 
not seem to work for whatever reasons, and public administration scholars have identified plenty 
over the years. Looking ahead, researchers should mount more studies on personnel constraints 
and try to move from managerial perceptions of constraints to more objective measures, such as 
time delays in hiring and disciplining employees. Perhaps the connections to performance could 
be examined more carefully as well. For example, are the impacts different across the various 
dimensions of performance such as efficiency, effectiveness, and equity? In addition, researchers 
need to pry into other fundamental assumptions that underlie the theory and practice of public 
management. This will likely confirm many of our suspicions but confront us with a few 
surprises. Nonetheless, it is nonetheless important for researchers and practitioners to have access 
to the best knowledge available as they ply their respective trades. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics at the organizational level of analysis 
 
 
Variable 
 
Mean Sd Minimum Maximum 
CSP 2003 68.15 7.87 48.33 88.33 
CSP 2004 71.76 7.36 51.67 88.33 
Deprivation 27.28 11.91 4.89 61.34 
Developmental culture 10.29 1.126 6.5 13 
Diversity 2541.41 2220.10 372.71 8452.82 
Internal political climate 10.89 3.00 3.89 18.73 
Population change .73 .80 -.69 4.51 
Remove manager 4.53 .90 1.75 7 
Reward manager 5.29 .92 2.75 6.75 
 
N = 136 
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Table 2: Regression results: organizational level 
 
 
 M1 M2 
Remove manager -.94 (.72) + -1.03 (.45) * 
Reward manager   .59 (.72) .63 (.44) + 
Developmental culture 1.78 (.51) *** .55 (.32) * 
Internal political climate   .27 (20) + .16 (.12) + 
Deprivation -.01 (.05) .06 (.03) * 
Diversity -.00 (.00) * .00 (.00) 
Population change 1.95 (.76) + .28 (.47) 
CSP 2003 - .77 (.05) *** 
Constant   15.21 (4.99) *** 
F 4.387*** 44.761*** 
R2/Adj R2 .19/.15 .74/.72 
 
One-tailed tests 
+ p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 3: Means and ANOVA results for personnel constraints amongst echelons 
 
 Corporate 
officers 
 
Chief 
officers 
Service 
managers 
F-score Post hoc 
results 
      
Remove manager 4.40 
(1.42) 
4.63 
(1.32) 
4.80 
(1.16) 
3.335* 1 – 3 
Reward manager 4.86 
(1.47) 
5.51 
(1.15) 
5.71 
(.93) 
18.705*** 1 – 2, 3 
      
 
 
 
 
 
